第五，零售業(yè)的資本支出較少，不像工業(yè)企業(yè)那樣有大額的固定資產(chǎn)支出，或者像高科技企業(yè)那樣要把很大一部分收入投入研發(fā)來(lái)保持自己的競爭力（require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow），風(fēng)險壓力較小。
巴菲特并不厭惡零售企業(yè)，相反，零售是Berkshire的所有業(yè)務(wù)中，與manufacturing, retailing, service and finance businesses等并列的重要業(yè)務(wù)。Berkshire的零售業(yè)務(wù)主要包括家居（家具）賣(mài)場(chǎng)和珠寶零售，后來(lái)把喜詩(shī)糖果（See’s Candies）也并入了零售業(yè)。
巴菲特對家居賣(mài)場(chǎng)情有獨鐘，自1983年首次收購了Nebraska Furniture Mart后，1995-1998年間，又一連串收購了多個(gè)家居賣(mài)場(chǎng)，分別是R.C. Willey Home Furnishings (1995), Star Furniture (1997)和Jordan's（1998）,使Berkshire旗下的家居賣(mài)場(chǎng)業(yè)務(wù)成為全美最大。
巴菲特對沃爾瑪一直非常欣賞和尊敬，并連續多年在《財富》雜志“最受尊敬企業(yè)”評選中把票投給了沃爾瑪（“For several years, I have given my vote to Wal-Mart in the ballotingfor Fortune Magazine’s “Most Admired” list.”）。2003年，巴菲特收購了沃爾瑪的批發(fā)和分銷(xiāo)業(yè)務(wù)部門(mén)McLane，而且沒(méi)有做盡職調查，這完全是基于巴菲特對沃爾瑪的信任（“We knew everything would be exactly as Wal-Mart said it would be –and it was.”）。2005年巴菲特開(kāi)始建倉沃爾瑪，截至2011年，Berkshire持有沃爾瑪1.1%的股份，市值23.33億美元。另外，巴菲特還在2007年開(kāi)始建倉Tesco，截至2011年，Berkshire持有Tesco 3.6%的股份，市值18.27億美元。
1995年，Berkshire收購了家居賣(mài)場(chǎng)R.C. Willey Home Furnishings之后，巴菲特在當年致股東的信中描述了這場(chǎng)收購的過(guò)程和原因后，寫(xiě)下了以下這段話(huà)：Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.（零售業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)相當不易，在我個(gè)人的投資生涯中，我見(jiàn)過(guò)很多零售企業(yè)曾經(jīng)擁有極高的增長(cháng)率和凈資產(chǎn)回報率，但之后卻突然出現業(yè)績(jì)跳水，甚至破產(chǎn)倒閉的情況。零售行業(yè)這種風(fēng)光一時(shí)的“流星現象”遠比一般制造業(yè)或服務(wù)業(yè)普遍，部分原因是零售業(yè)者必須時(shí)時(shí)保持聰明，因為你的競爭對手隨時(shí)準備抄襲你的做法，然后超越你。同時(shí)新的競爭者也不斷加入，用盡各種辦法撬走你的客戶(hù)。在零售業(yè)，業(yè)績(jì)一旦下滑就注定失敗。）
因為以上這段話(huà)，使投資者對零售業(yè)產(chǎn)生了很大的疑慮。不過(guò)，巴菲特這一段話(huà)的意思并非是說(shuō)零售企業(yè)不值得投資，或者自己買(mǎi)R.C. Willey買(mǎi)錯了，而是說(shuō)像零售業(yè)這種必須時(shí)時(shí)保持聰明的行業(yè)里，企業(yè)有一個(gè)聰明的經(jīng)營(yíng)者是必須的，如果經(jīng)營(yíng)者懈怠、得過(guò)且過(guò)，則企業(yè)必定會(huì )垮。接下去巴菲特說(shuō)的是，他當年買(mǎi)的兩個(gè)零售企業(yè)（另一家是珠寶零售商）的CEO都非常棒，他們酷愛(ài)競爭并在長(cháng)期的競爭中保持勝績(jì)（The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades.）。而結論當然是，他當年買(mǎi)的這兩個(gè)零售企業(yè)，都是符合零售企業(yè)投資標準的。
類(lèi)似得了便宜還賣(mài)乖的說(shuō)法，還屢屢出現在巴菲特對其主業(yè)——保險業(yè)的抱怨中。他說(shuō)：The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels. （保險業(yè)競爭者眾多，門(mén)檻很低，產(chǎn)品無(wú)法差異化，只有少數成本很低或者找到“利基”的企業(yè)才能保持較高的贏(yíng)利水平。）
顯然，巴菲特沒(méi)有任何要放棄保險業(yè)這一核心業(yè)務(wù)的想法，而且要繼續把保險業(yè)作為主要的贏(yíng)利來(lái)源，原因是保險業(yè)夠大，Berkshire的保險業(yè)務(wù)有競爭優(yōu)勢和全球范圍內的競爭力。(Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide; and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage.）
五、巴菲特投資零售業(yè)的邏輯
巴菲特關(guān)于家居賣(mài)場(chǎng)NFM和珠寶零售商Borsheim's優(yōu)勢的描述，體現了他零售業(yè)的投資邏輯： They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners. （買(mǎi)的便宜，遠比競爭對手低的成本收入比，然后把節省下來(lái)的成本讓利給消費者。這就是最理想的生意——在給客戶(hù)創(chuàng )造額外的價(jià)值的基礎上，給股東創(chuàng )造額外的收益。）
Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round and 'round. （因為銷(xiāo)售量夠大，所以能保持品種多樣，并把成本收入比控制在很低的水平。成本控制加上采購議價(jià)能力，使它有能力保持低價(jià)，低價(jià)又能帶來(lái)更高的銷(xiāo)售量，如此形成良性循環(huán)。）
他進(jìn)一步總結了家居賣(mài)場(chǎng)NFM和珠寶零售商Borsheim's的成功之處：NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times. （遠比對手豐富的品類(lèi)；極低的運營(yíng)成本；買(mǎi)的便宜[買(mǎi)的便宜的原因，部分是因為采購規模，除此外還有別的原因]；比競爭對手低的售價(jià)和毛利；友好的、個(gè)性化的服務(wù)。）
總結一句話(huà)，巴菲特投資零售企業(yè)的邏輯是，選擇那些因運營(yíng)成本低而具備持續給消費者讓利能力的企業(yè)（low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values）。從這個(gè)角度看，國美的銷(xiāo)售規模與蘇寧相當，但毛利率低于蘇寧（根據蘇寧、國美2011年報，蘇寧的綜合毛利率為19.23%，國美為18.15%，略低于蘇寧），費用率高于蘇寧（根據蘇寧、國美2011年報，蘇寧的費用率為11.95%，國美為14.27%，高于蘇寧），不具備成本優(yōu)勢，這就注定了無(wú)論有沒(méi)有黃光裕，國美都難以在長(cháng)期競爭中勝出。網(wǎng)絡(luò )購物也不是通過(guò)“革命”，而是通過(guò)進(jìn)一步降低成本、提高效率來(lái)取得競爭優(yōu)勢的。京東有沒(méi)有成本優(yōu)勢，要看它跟易購相比是否存在成本優(yōu)勢，否則，即使贏(yíng)了蘇寧的線(xiàn)下實(shí)體店，也不一定贏(yíng)得了蘇寧的線(xiàn)上業(yè)務(wù)。
巴菲特曾經(jīng)這樣比較像零售這樣的競爭性行業(yè)和有“特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權”的行業(yè)的區別： In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy. （零售行業(yè)需要時(shí)時(shí)保持聰明，否則遲早會(huì )垮掉。還有一些行業(yè)，只要買(mǎi)入時(shí)做對一次決定就可以了，例如，像有線(xiàn)電視臺這種有“特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權”的行業(yè)，買(mǎi)入之后隨便交給一個(gè)得過(guò)且過(guò)的親戚去管，也能經(jīng)營(yíng)好。）
In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management. （競爭性行業(yè)企業(yè)只有在成本較競爭者低，或者產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)供給不足時(shí)，才能獲得高回報。供給不足不能持續，卓越的管理可以使低成本保持很長(cháng)的時(shí)間，但也會(huì )面臨持續不斷的競爭。若管理不當，則可能招致致命的風(fēng)險。）
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage. （“特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權”存在于那些產(chǎn)品或者服務(wù)是必需的或者很受歡迎、沒(méi)有替代產(chǎn)品、價(jià)格不受管制的企業(yè)中。有“特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權”的企業(yè)可以持續地提價(jià)，獲取更高的回報，平庸的管理可能侵蝕其盈利能力，但不會(huì )招致致命的風(fēng)險。）
