個(gè)人認為，鮑威爾在杰克遜霍爾會(huì )議上的發(fā)言是今年最“鷹”的一次，甚于6、7月例會(huì )，美股聞?dòng)嵈蠓爻?。筆者在7月會(huì )議紀要點(diǎn)評（“緊縮不足”仍是短期矛盾的主要方面——FOMC會(huì )議紀要學(xué)習筆記（2022年7月））和對本次JH會(huì )議前瞻中（培訓預告 | 杰克遜霍爾會(huì )議解讀與美聯(lián)儲政策前瞻：就業(yè)視角）都提到，當前的主要矛盾仍是通脹，鮑威爾首先是擔心“緊縮不足”，其次才是“過(guò)度緊縮”。這次會(huì )議中提到的“三個(gè)教訓”，一是向市場(chǎng)傳遞信心，美聯(lián)儲可以實(shí)現低且穩定的2%通脹目標；二是強調通脹預期發(fā)揮的“錨”的作用，聯(lián)系到了工資-物價(jià)螺旋，因為勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)依然非常緊張；三是明確了“緊縮不足”的風(fēng)險。如果市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)會(huì )了鮑威爾的意思，長(cháng)期通脹預期會(huì )進(jìn)一步下行，或至少會(huì )保持在略高于2%目標的水平上，而不會(huì )脫錨。以下為原文、翻譯和我的評議。
1. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak here today.
謝謝給我今天在這里演講的機會(huì )。
2. At past Jackson
Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the ever-changing
structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy under
high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my
message more direct.
在以前的杰克遜霍爾會(huì )議上，我討論的話(huà)題很廣泛，比如不斷變化的經(jīng)濟結構，以及在高度不確定的環(huán)境中實(shí)施貨幣政策的挑戰。今天，我的講話(huà)將會(huì )更簡(jiǎn)短，重點(diǎn)更集中，信息更直接。
3. The Federal Open
Market Committee's (FOMC) overarching focus right now is to bring inflation
back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the
Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price
stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price
stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market
conditions that benefit all. The burdens of high inflation fall heaviest on
those who are least able to bear them.
聯(lián)邦公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)委員會(huì )(FOMC)目前的首要任務(wù)是將通脹降到2%的目標水平。物價(jià)穩定是美聯(lián)儲的職責所在（注：寫(xiě)進(jìn)了《聯(lián)邦儲備法案》），也是我們經(jīng)濟平穩運行的基石。沒(méi)有價(jià)格穩定，經(jīng)濟的運行對任何人來(lái)說(shuō)都將是不合意的。特別是，如果沒(méi)有價(jià)格穩定，我們將無(wú)法恢復有利于所有人的、持久的和強勁的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)。高通脹最沉重的負擔將會(huì )落在那些最無(wú)力承受的人的身上。
評議：美聯(lián)儲的貨幣政策現在非常關(guān)注分配與公平。
20世紀70年代中期以來(lái)，美國貧富分化問(wèn)題日漸突出。這在收入流量與財富存量分配格局中都有體現。一般認為，其原因主要是結構性的——技能偏好性技術(shù)進(jìn)步、經(jīng)濟的全球化和金融化、市場(chǎng)集中度和企業(yè)議價(jià)能力的提升、數字經(jīng)濟的“贏(yíng)家通吃”特征等。長(cháng)期以來(lái)，美聯(lián)儲貨幣政策目標并未明確包含分配的維度，但越來(lái)越多的證據顯示，分配格局的惡化卻直接影響到“物價(jià)穩定”和“最大就業(yè)”目標的實(shí)現，因為貧富分化是導致經(jīng)濟長(cháng)期停滯、壓抑自然利率和物價(jià)水平的重要原因。所以，如何更好地調節收入分配已經(jīng)成為美聯(lián)儲貨幣政策的題中之意。2008年大危機以來(lái)，量化寬松政策在托底整體經(jīng)濟和阻遏風(fēng)險傳染的同時(shí)，也會(huì )通過(guò)資產(chǎn)價(jià)格重估效應而加劇財富分配的不均等，這又反過(guò)來(lái)影響到經(jīng)濟復蘇的持續性，提高貨幣政策面臨“零利率下線(xiàn)”約束的長(cháng)期性。所以，美聯(lián)儲必須考慮貨幣政策的分配效應。疫情沖擊的特殊性在于，大量就業(yè)者退出了勞動(dòng)力隊伍，勞動(dòng)參與率大幅下挫，這使得官方失業(yè)率顯著(zhù)低估了真實(shí)失業(yè)水平和失業(yè)缺口。后疫情時(shí)代，被低估的失業(yè)率和就業(yè)市場(chǎng)的“K型復蘇”特征成為美聯(lián)儲退出非常規政策的“絆腳石”。4. Restoring price
stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring
demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require
a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be
some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower
growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will
also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate
costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would
mean far greater pain.恢復價(jià)格穩定還需要一段時(shí)間，這需要我們有力地運用貨幣政策工具，使需求和供應更好地平衡。為了降低通脹，經(jīng)濟增長(cháng)速度可能在一段時(shí)間內會(huì )持續低于潛在增速。而且，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)狀況很可能會(huì )有所弱化。利率的上升、經(jīng)濟增長(cháng)速度的放緩和就業(yè)市場(chǎng)的疲軟都會(huì )降低通脹，但也會(huì )給家庭和企業(yè)帶來(lái)一些痛苦。這些都是降低通脹不幸的代價(jià)。如果不能實(shí)現價(jià)格穩定，損失會(huì )更嚴重。評議：供不應求是當前通脹的成因，貨幣政策只能作用于需求，故只能通過(guò)收縮需求壓制通脹。鮑威爾接受了壓制通脹會(huì )犧牲短期經(jīng)濟增長(cháng)的事實(shí)，但強調這是“兩害相權取其輕”，算是在為后文做鋪墊。5. The U.S. economy
is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which
reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While
the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to
show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but
it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding
the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and
high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower
inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month's improvement falls
far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that
inflation is moving down.相對于2021年歷史最高水平的經(jīng)濟增速而言——反映了大流行沖擊后的經(jīng)濟重啟，美國經(jīng)濟增長(cháng)率開(kāi)始明顯放緩。雖然最新的經(jīng)濟數據好壞參半，但在我看來(lái)，我們的經(jīng)濟繼續保持著(zhù)強勁的動(dòng)能。勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)尤其強勁，但它顯然是失衡的，對工人的需求大大超過(guò)了可用工人的供應。通貨膨脹率遠高于2%，高通貨膨脹率繼續在經(jīng)濟中蔓延。盡管7月通脹數據下降了，這令人欣慰，但單個(gè)月的下降還遠不足以使委員會(huì )確信通脹的拐點(diǎn)已經(jīng)出現。評議：如何才能讓FOMC確信通脹的拐點(diǎn)已經(jīng)確立了？這是分析的要點(diǎn)，顯然，7月單月的小幅下行是不滿(mǎn)足條件的。個(gè)人認為，既要關(guān)注通脹的水平，也要關(guān)注結構、動(dòng)態(tài)的路徑和波動(dòng)率。6. We are moving our
policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently
restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent
meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to
2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection's (SEP)
range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in
the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2
percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral
are not a place to stop or pause.我們會(huì )確保一個(gè)足夠緊縮的政策立場(chǎng)，以使通貨膨脹下降到2%的水平。在7月的會(huì )議上，FOMC將聯(lián)邦基金利率的目標區間上調至2.25 - 2.5%，這是經(jīng)濟預測摘要（SEP）對長(cháng)期聯(lián)邦基金利率區間的估計（注：即中性利率區間）。目前的特征事實(shí)是，通脹遠高于2%，且就業(yè)市場(chǎng)極度緊張。所以，還不是停止或暫停加息的時(shí)候。評議：加息表明貨幣政策趨于收緊，但不一定是過(guò)緊（或偏緊），只要FFR低于中性利率，就可以認為貨幣政策還處于寬松區間?？蓪OMC季度預測（SEP）當中關(guān)于FFR的長(cháng)期預測視為中性利率，2022年6月的最新預測為2.5%，等于7月加息后FFR目標區間的上限。這意味著(zhù)，9月加息后，貨幣政策才從偏松轉向偏緊。疫情之后，數據噪聲較大，一個(gè)較為普遍的觀(guān)點(diǎn)認為，對中性利率的估計存在較大的誤差，以至于紐約聯(lián)儲都暫停對外發(fā)布模型的最新預測結果。實(shí)踐中，可用美國國債期限結構來(lái)衡量貨幣政策的松緊程度，常用的指標有：3個(gè)月國庫券與10年國債的期限利差（3M-10Y）、1年國債與10年國債利差（1Y-10Y）或2年國債與10年國債利差（2Y-10Y）。三個(gè)指標的走勢基本一致。3M-10Y與另外兩個(gè)指標短期可能出現背離，但遲早會(huì )收斂。7. July's increase in
the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings,
and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at
our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our
decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming
data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy
tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of
increases.
7月是今年第二次加息75個(gè)基點(diǎn)，我當時(shí)說(shuō)，再來(lái)一次不同尋常的大幅度的加息可能是合適的。我們現在大約已經(jīng)過(guò)了休會(huì )期的一半。9月例會(huì )的決定將取決于獲得的全部數據和不斷演變的前景。在某個(gè)時(shí)點(diǎn)，隨著(zhù)貨幣政策的立場(chǎng)進(jìn)一步收緊，放緩加息的步伐可能是合適的。評議：“某個(gè)時(shí)點(diǎn)”的確定主要取決于美聯(lián)儲是否確認通脹正在確定地朝著(zhù)2%目標收斂。美聯(lián)儲內部的研究人員一般會(huì )給一個(gè)預測的通脹路徑，FOMC成員會(huì )結合就業(yè)等基本面信息的預測，反推不同時(shí)點(diǎn)合適的貨幣政策立場(chǎng)。當然，后疫情時(shí)代預測非常不靠譜，FOMC也必須將這一點(diǎn)考慮進(jìn)來(lái)。8. Restoring price
stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some
time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening
policy. Committee participants' most recent individual projections from the
June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent
through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the
September meeting.恢復物價(jià)穩定可能（還）需要在一段時(shí)間內保持緊縮的政策立場(chǎng)。歷史的經(jīng)驗教訓對過(guò)早地放松政策提出了強烈警告。6月的SEP顯示，FOMC成員預測到2023年底聯(lián)邦基金利率的中位數略低于4%。FOMC將在9月的會(huì )議上更新他們的預測。評議：正如我在點(diǎn)評7月會(huì )議紀要中說(shuō)的，美聯(lián)儲首先是擔心緊縮不足，其次才是緊縮過(guò)度。9. Our monetary
policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about
inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and
1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In
particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.我們對貨幣政策的審議和決策基于我們從上世紀七八十年代的高且不穩定的通脹以及過(guò)去四分之一世紀的低而穩定的通脹中對通脹的認識。值得強調的是，我們吸取了三個(gè)重要教訓：10. The first lesson
is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and
stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once
needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has
shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation
period.1 Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to
deliver price stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high
inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face
inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States. It is also
true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product
of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed's tools work
principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve's
responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability.
There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply.
We are committed to doing that job.第一個(gè)教訓是，央行能夠且應該承擔起實(shí)現低而穩定的通脹的責任?；乜礆v史，以前還需要說(shuō)服中央銀行家們和其他人接受這兩點(diǎn)似乎有些奇怪，但正如前主席本·伯南克所表明的那樣，這兩個(gè)主張在大通脹時(shí)期都受到了廣泛的質(zhì)疑。今天，這些問(wèn)題已經(jīng)解決了。維護價(jià)格穩定，我們責無(wú)旁貸。的確，目前的高通脹是一個(gè)全球現象，許多經(jīng)濟體都面臨著(zhù)高通脹壓力，有的國家甚至比美國還要高。在我看來(lái)，美國目前的高通脹也是強勁的需求和受限的供給共同的結果。美聯(lián)儲的工具主要針對總需求。但這不會(huì )削弱美聯(lián)儲承擔維護價(jià)格穩定任務(wù)的責任。顯然，我們需要做的是緩和需求，使其與供應更好地匹配。我們正致力于此。評議：對外安撫市場(chǎng)、公眾，對內建立自信，給小伙伴們打氣。11. The second lesson
is that the public's expectations about future inflation can play an important
role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures,
longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is
broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of
market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with
inflation having run well above our goal for some time.第二個(gè)教訓是，公眾對未來(lái)通脹的預期可以在通脹的未來(lái)走向方面發(fā)揮重要作用。當下，從許多指標來(lái)看，長(cháng)期通脹預期的“錨”還在。對家庭、企業(yè)和預測機構的調查，以及基于市場(chǎng)的衡量標準，大致都是如此。但這不是自滿(mǎn)的理由，通脹遠高于我們的目標已經(jīng)有一段時(shí)間了。評議：通脹預期在持續高通脹的形成過(guò)程中至關(guān)重要。當前，美國的短期通脹預期明顯高于長(cháng)期——通脹的期限結構是倒掛的，這是美聯(lián)儲還能夠在一定程度上去平衡短期與長(cháng)期目標的原因。穩定的通脹預期能為貨幣政策當局提供更多跨期最優(yōu)決策的空間，即不以短期目標而犧牲中長(cháng)期目標。相反，通脹預期越不穩定，錨定通脹預期的成本就越高，也就越要求貨幣當局對短期的壓力做出更積極的響應，而這可能要求犧牲長(cháng)期目標。12. If the public
expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major
shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high
and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the
anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decision-making
of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to
expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions.
As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in
1979, 'Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning
to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of
inflationary expectations.'2如果公眾預期通脹將在一段時(shí)間內保持在低且穩定的水平上，那么，在沒(méi)有重大沖擊的情況下，實(shí)際情況很可能也會(huì )如此。不幸的是，對于高且不穩定的通脹預期也會(huì )自我實(shí)現。上世紀70年代，隨著(zhù)通脹的攀升，對高通脹的預期在家庭和企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟決策中變得根深蒂固。通貨膨脹率越高，人們就越預期它還會(huì )保持在高位，他們把這種信念嵌入在工資和定價(jià)決策上。正如前美聯(lián)儲主席保羅·沃爾克在1979年通脹達到頂峰時(shí)說(shuō)的，“通脹在一定程度上是自我反饋的，因此，要想恢復一個(gè)更穩定、生產(chǎn)率更高的經(jīng)濟，必須將一部分精力放在控制通脹預期上?！?評議：通脹預期會(huì )自我實(shí)現。貨幣當局之所以關(guān)注通脹預期，原因是它對定價(jià)行為的影響，包括物價(jià)和工資，以及二者之間的正反饋關(guān)系。當預期通脹居高不下時(shí)，勞動(dòng)者一般會(huì )要求更高的工資，或指數化的工資決定機制，比如與生活成本（Cost-of-Living Adjustment，COLA）掛鉤。當企業(yè)預期到要素成本存在上行壓力時(shí)，會(huì )根據議價(jià)能力和商品的需求價(jià)格彈性的大小選擇將一部分成本轉嫁給消費者，從而形成“工資-物價(jià)螺旋”。這是20世紀70年代“大滯脹”形成的重要原因。工資決定的是通脹的趨勢，而非波動(dòng)?！肮べY-物價(jià)螺旋”一旦形成，通脹預期就脫錨了。是貨幣當局最不愿意面對的環(huán)境。工資和物價(jià)都是有粘性的，“工資-物價(jià)螺旋”的形成有較高的前置條件，比如緊張的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)、較高的集體談判權、寬松的貨幣政策、較高的中長(cháng)期通脹預期等?！按缶徍汀睍r(shí)代以來(lái)，市場(chǎng)和政策制定者都習慣了通脹預期穩定或存在通脹缺口的宏觀(guān)環(huán)境，忘卻了“工資-通脹螺旋”的風(fēng)險。直到2022年7月例會(huì )，FOMC依然否認“工資-通脹螺旋”是通脹的一個(gè)成因，當然這也是市場(chǎng)的共識，但不可否認風(fēng)險正在積聚。
13. One useful insight
into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is
based in the concept of 'rational inattention.'3 When inflation is
persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and
incorporate inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and
stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan
Greenspan put it this way: 'For all practical purposes, price stability
means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and
gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household
financial decisions.'4
關(guān)于實(shí)際通脹可能會(huì )怎樣影響人們對其未來(lái)走向的預期，一個(gè)有用的洞見(jiàn)建立在“理性忽視”的概念上。當通貨膨脹持續高企時(shí)，家庭和企業(yè)必須密切關(guān)注并將通貨膨脹納入他們的經(jīng)濟決策。當通貨膨脹處于低位且穩定時(shí)，他們可以更自由地將注意力集中在其他地方。前美聯(lián)儲主席艾倫·格林斯潘這樣說(shuō):“從實(shí)際角度來(lái)看，價(jià)格穩定意味著(zhù)平均價(jià)格水平的預期變化足夠地小，足夠地平滑，它們不會(huì )實(shí)質(zhì)性地影響企業(yè)和家庭的金融決策?！?評議：所謂“理性忽視”，就是注意不到通脹的存在，不將其納入到金融、經(jīng)濟決策行為中，例如：不要求債權人不好求更高的通脹補償收益率，勞動(dòng)者不要求更高的工資、企業(yè)不指定更高的物價(jià)等。14. Of course,
inflation has just about everyone's attention right now, which highlights a
particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues,
the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become
entrenched.當然，目前幾乎所有人都在關(guān)注通脹，這凸顯了一種特殊的風(fēng)險：高通脹持續的時(shí)間越長(cháng)，對通脹上升的預期變得更加根深蒂固的可能性就越大。15. That brings me to
the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done.
History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely
to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and
price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed
multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A
lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to
stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the
low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim
is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.這就引出了我的第三個(gè)教訓，那就是我們必須堅持下去，直到工作完成。歷史表明，隨著(zhù)高通脹在工資和物價(jià)的制定中變得更加根深蒂固，降低通脹的就業(yè)成本可能會(huì )隨著(zhù)時(shí)間的延遲增加。上世紀80年代初沃爾克抗通脹的成功是在此前15年多次降低通脹的嘗試失敗之后發(fā)生的。為了遏制高通脹，需要長(cháng)期執行非常緊縮的貨幣政策，以將通脹降至低而穩定的水平——這是2021年春天之前的常態(tài)。我們的目標是通過(guò)現在果斷的行動(dòng)來(lái)避免這樣的結果（長(cháng)期實(shí)施緊縮政策）。評議：堅定信心，謹防在通脹剛剛有點(diǎn)下降的苗頭，或者下行的趨勢還不穩固的時(shí)候就理解轉變緊縮的政策立場(chǎng)，以權衡就業(yè)/經(jīng)濟增長(cháng)目標。16. These lessons are
guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful
and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with
supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we
are confident the job is done.這些經(jīng)驗教訓在指導我們使用我們的工具來(lái)降低通貨膨脹。我們正在采取有力而迅速的措施來(lái)調節需求，使其更好地與供給保持一致，并穩定通脹預期。我們將繼續努力，直到我們確信完成了這項工作。主要內容：1. 專(zhuān)題直播（預告 PPT 數據）；2. 深度報告（原版 PPT 數據）；3.學(xué)術(shù)文獻（電子版 筆記）；4. 每周書(shū)單（電子書(shū) 筆記）；5. 經(jīng)濟時(shí)評（原版）；6. 研究小記
本站僅提供存儲服務(wù)，所有內容均由用戶(hù)發(fā)布，如發(fā)現有害或侵權內容，請
點(diǎn)擊舉報。
