編者按：本文編譯自 Floodgate 基金的合伙人 Mike Maples 的博文《Finding Billion Dollar Secrets》。
譯者戴汨，愉悅資本創(chuàng )始合伙人（midai@joycapital.com.cn, 微信 midai2008）。
很多人讀過(guò) Peter Thiel 的《從 0 到 1》，殊不知對 Peter Theil 影響最大的是法國哲學(xué)家勒內·吉拉爾的觀(guān)點(diǎn)：人的欲望是模仿的。擺脫模仿這個(gè)錯誤的操作系統，你才能找到創(chuàng )造傳奇企業(yè)的秘密。
Enjoy：
If you aspire to do something truly legendary, in business or any other field, you will discover that the biggest breakthroughs come from obsessively pursuing insights that defy conventional wisdom.
如果你渴望做一些真正傳奇的事情，在商業(yè)或者其他任何領(lǐng)域，你會(huì )發(fā)現，最大的突破來(lái)自于：執著(zhù)追求不同于傳統智慧的見(jiàn)解。
In the startup world, this translates to having what PayPal founder and Facebook investor Peter Thiel calls a “secret” or what Benchmark co-founder Andy Rachleff would describe as an idea that is “non-consensus and right.” Before diving into why this is true, let’ s summarize these two views:
在創(chuàng )業(yè)的世界里，這可以翻譯為：PayPal 的創(chuàng )始人和 Facebook 的投資者 Peter Thiel 所說(shuō)的 “秘密”，或者 Benchmark 基金的聯(lián)合創(chuàng )始人 Andy Rachleff 所形容的 “非共識” 但正確的想法。在仔細討論為什么是這樣之前，我們先總結一下這兩種觀(guān)點(diǎn)：
1. Peter Thiel: Great founders hunt for secrets （偉大的創(chuàng )始人追尋秘密）
From his days as a Stanford student, Peter Thiel was influenced by the French philosopher René Girard. I learned of his work a little over a decade ago and loved it. One of Girard’ s fundamental ideas is that human desire is mimetic, which means that most of our desires come from our observations of the desires of other people, rather than the desires we generate internally for ourselves. There are LOTS of implications to this for society, and Peter describes them in his book Zero to One as they relate to startups. The first is that the vast majority of us act out of mimetic desire as if by reflex, starting early in life. We compete for trophies. We get rewarded in school for giving the exact answers the teacher is looking for, but we are often discouraged from providing answers that are too different. “Successful” people often double down on this by seeking education at prestigious Universities, by earning high-paying jobs, and by using the money to live a lifestyle that is broadly desired and admired. It becomes so ingrained in most people’ s thinking that it no longer seems to be a conscious choice.
當他還是斯坦福大學(xué)學(xué)生的時(shí)候，Peter Thiel 就受法國哲學(xué)家勒內.吉拉爾影響。我大概十年前了解到他的作品，并愛(ài)上了它。吉拉爾的一個(gè)基本思想是：人的欲望是模仿的，這意味著(zhù)我們的大部分欲望來(lái)自于我們對其他人欲望的觀(guān)察，而不是我們內成的自我欲望。這對社會(huì )有很多的的含義，Peter 在他的書(shū) “從 0 到 1” 中描述了這些含義，因為它們與初創(chuàng )公司有關(guān)。第一個(gè)是，從人生的早期開(kāi)始，我們絕大多數人都是條件反射性的受模仿欲望驅使。我們爭奪獎杯。我們在學(xué)校里，給老師想要的答案會(huì )得到獎勵，給過(guò)于不同的答案常常不被鼓勵。 “成功” 人士的故事加倍強化了這一效應，他們尋求名牌大學(xué)的教育，賺取高薪職位，并用這些錢(qián)過(guò)上廣泛推崇和羨慕的生活。它在大多數人的思維中根深蒂固，以至于看起來(lái)都不像是有意識的選擇。
The problem with mimetic desire is that it’ s the wrong “personal operating system” for coming up with a breakthrough idea?—?it is by definition an incrementalist view of the world that emphasizes following the rules and outcompeting others, rather than re-inventing the rules and transcending competition. His second point is that most of us, having been programmed by mimetic desires our entire lives, find it hard not to be reactive to what others are doing. As an investor, I can relate to the many pitches with multiple competitors in a matrix, and their product has more checks than all the others. A typical “mimetic” person will think this way. But a non-conventional founder will notice that chart and immediately two words will come to mind?—?mindless competition.
模仿性欲望的問(wèn)題是，它是錯誤的 “個(gè)人操作系統”，難以產(chǎn)生突破性的想法。從定義上，它是漸進(jìn)主義世界觀(guān)， 強調了遵守規則和超越別人，而不是重新發(fā)明規則和超越競爭。他的第二點(diǎn)是，我們大多數人，整個(gè)人生已經(jīng)被模擬性愿望所編程，很難對別人在做什么不做出反應。作為一個(gè)投資者，我容易想起：很多的融資文檔在矩陣圖上列示了多個(gè)競爭對手，而他們的產(chǎn)品具有比其他更多對手更多的功能。一個(gè)典型的 “模仿” 的人會(huì )像這樣思考。非傳統的創(chuàng )始人看到這個(gè)圖表，兩個(gè)詞會(huì )浮現在腦海中 - 盲目競爭。
Another example is when entrepreneurs say things like “We are like Uber for massages,” or “We are like WhatsApp for enterprises” or “We are like Slack for families.” By definition, framing a business this way is likely not based on a fundamental insight. Many competitors (some known and most unknown) have also probably considered these ideas. When I hear a pitch like this, I begin to imagine René Girard is sitting in the room with me.
另一個(gè)例子是，當創(chuàng )業(yè)者說(shuō)“Uber 模式的按摩服務(wù)”，或者“我們像企業(yè)版的WhatsApp”，或者“我們像家庭版的 Slack” 的時(shí)候，根據定義，這樣來(lái)描述一個(gè)業(yè)務(wù)基本上不可能是基于一個(gè)根本性的洞見(jiàn)的。許多競爭對手（一些已知和大多數未知的）也可能考慮這些想法。當我聽(tīng)到這樣的融資說(shuō)法，我開(kāi)始想象勒內.吉拉爾正和我一起坐在房間里。
Founders who hunt for secrets take a different view. They know that all important things we take for granted today?—?things like Euclidean geometry, the fact that the world is round and not the center of the Universe, quantum physics, how to harness electricity?—?were once secrets uncovered by people who were considered heretics in their time. Like the people through the ages who made great discoveries, great founders similarly tend to gravitate to business ideas that are unconventional breakthroughs based on their domain expertise. Uncovering a true secret can be incredibly valuable.
那些追尋秘密的創(chuàng )始人持不同的見(jiàn)解。他們知道，我們習以為常的今天所有重要的東西 - 比如歐幾里德幾何，地球是圓的而且不是宇宙的中心，量子物理學(xué)，如何利用電 - 都是被那些在他們的時(shí)代被視為異端的人所發(fā)現的秘密。和那些不同年代的偉大發(fā)現者一樣，偉大的創(chuàng )始人著(zhù)迷的商業(yè)想法一定是基于他們專(zhuān)業(yè)知識的非常規的突破。揭示一個(gè)真正的秘密的價(jià)值無(wú)與倫比。
2. Andy Rachleff: Be non-consensus and right （非共識且正確）
Andy Rachleff views unconventional success through a slightly different lens but with the same broad takeaway. Andy’ s argument, influenced by Howard Marks of Oak Tree Capital, goes as follows: Startup ideas have two dimensions. On one dimension, you can be right or wrong. On the other, you can be consensus or non-consensus.
Andy Rachleff 采用略有不同的透鏡來(lái)看待非傳統的成功，但同樣具有廣泛的意義。Andy 的說(shuō)法，受橡樹(shù)資本 Howard Marks 先生的影響。創(chuàng )業(yè)的想法有兩個(gè)維度：一個(gè)維度上，你可以是對或者是錯；另一維度上，你可以是有共識或非共識 （相對于別人）。
Wrong is always bad. （錯誤了肯定是不行）
Obviously, if you are wrong, you are wrong. That’ s bad. You fail.
很明顯，錯了就是錯了。錯了肯定不行。錯了你就失敗了。
…But being right is not enough.（但是正確了并不夠）
Most people don’ t realize that if you are right and consensus, you are usually not successful enough to make a significant impact. Your startup might be onto a good idea that has customers eager to adopt the product. But as your company races toward product/market fit, it encounters severe obstacles. Because the opportunity is widely believed to have promise, multiple me-too competitors are funded by me-too VCs. As competition floods the market, prices erode, sales cycles lengthen, and more money gets poured into the sector. These markets often turn into a VC funding arms race, and each round of financing comes with massive dilution for the founders and employees. In the meantime, potential acquirers gain increasing power to choose among many worthy and well-financed competitors when they consider M&A opportunities, further capping the upside for founders and employees.
大多數人沒(méi)有意識到，如果你是對的，并且符合共識，你通常難以足夠成功并做出顯著(zhù)的影響。你的創(chuàng )業(yè)公司可能基于一個(gè)好主意，有客戶(hù)渴望采用產(chǎn)品。但是，隨著(zhù)你的公司朝著(zhù)產(chǎn)品 / 市場(chǎng)契合邁進(jìn)，它遇到嚴重障礙。因為這個(gè)機會(huì )被廣泛認為有希望，很多 “我也一樣” 的競爭對手也會(huì )獲得 “我也一樣” 的 VC 的投資。隨著(zhù)競爭充斥市場(chǎng)，價(jià)格受到侵蝕，銷(xiāo)售周期加長(cháng)，更多的錢(qián)進(jìn)入這個(gè)領(lǐng)域。這些市場(chǎng)往往會(huì )變成一個(gè)風(fēng)險投資軍備競賽，融資的每一輪都帶來(lái)對創(chuàng )始人和員工的大量稀釋。與此同時(shí)，潛在收購者在考慮并購機會(huì )的時(shí)候，議價(jià)實(shí)力不斷增強，可以在多個(gè)有價(jià)值并且資金充足的競爭對手之間進(jìn)行選擇， 進(jìn)一步扼殺了創(chuàng )始人和員工的上升空間。
The path to Legendary: Non-consensus and right （通向傳奇之路： 非共識并且正確）
Apart from the obvious reason that it pays to be a correct contrarian, the dynamics of startups make it vital to be non-consensus and right. It is extraordinarily difficult for a tiny, undercapitalized, understaffed company with zero customers and no market awareness to identify and exploit a new opportunity fast enough to leave all competitors behind. As soon as a business opportunity becomes apparent to even a small number of people, the odds begin to work against the startup. I call this effect the “Startup Law of the Jungle.”
成為一個(gè)正確的逆勢而為者回報可觀(guān)，不僅如此，創(chuàng )業(yè)公司的生存環(huán)境也決定了非共識并且正確是至關(guān)重要的。對于一個(gè)微小的、投資不足、人手不足的公司， 沒(méi)有客戶(hù)也沒(méi)有沒(méi)有市場(chǎng)知名度，要快速識別和利用一個(gè)新的機會(huì )并甩下所有的競爭對手，是無(wú)比困難的事情。當一個(gè)商業(yè)機會(huì )變得明顯，即使只有少數人知道了，賠率對創(chuàng )業(yè)公司也會(huì )變得越來(lái)越不利。我稱(chēng)這種效應為 “叢林創(chuàng )業(yè)法則”。
If you’ ve ever watched the Nature Channel and seen a baby wildebeest born on the Serengeti plains of East Africa, you can get a visceral feel for what the typical startup faces in its early days. The baby wildebeest is dropped out of its mother’ s womb onto the ground in a wet sack. It can barely stand up and wipe itself off, much less start walking. If the baby animal takes more than five minutes to get moving, it will find itself surrounded by hyenas, jackals, and Nubian vultures circling from above in the sky. Similarly, in the “Startup Law of the Jungle,” startups are initially very vulnerable to the various predators and hazards that surround them. Being non-consensus and right affords the startup the time and runway to survive, adapt, and succeed after trial and error without fatal consequences. It lets them master a set of differentiable and specific skills, and build strength for inevitable competitive battles that will come in the future. When you’ re starting out, it’ s better if your potential competitors don’ t care about what you’ re doing.
如果你曾經(jīng)看過(guò)的 “大自然” 頻道，看到出生于東非塞倫蓋蒂平原的嬰兒牛羚，你可以體會(huì )到什么是典型的創(chuàng )業(yè)公司早期面臨的感覺(jué)。嬰兒牛羚包在一個(gè)濕袋子里從母親的子宮里倍扔到地面上。它連站起來(lái)把自己擦干凈都困難，更不用說(shuō)開(kāi)始走路了。如果小牛羚 5 分鐘內不能移動(dòng)，它會(huì )發(fā)現自己被鬣狗、豺和天空盤(pán)旋的努比亞禿鷲所包圍。同樣，在 “叢林創(chuàng )業(yè)法則” 中，初創(chuàng )公司也是非常脆弱，被各種食肉動(dòng)物和危害所包圍?！?strong>非共識并且正確” 這一條，可以給創(chuàng )業(yè)公司時(shí)間和跑道去生存、適應，并在無(wú)致命后果的反復試錯后獲得成功。這讓他們掌握了一整套的特定技能，并打造實(shí)力準備應對未來(lái)不可避免的競爭。當你開(kāi)始的時(shí)候，最好你的潛在競爭對手不關(guān)心你在做什么。
3.Case Study: Chegg （案例研究：Chegg)
As an investor, I’ ve experienced the good and the bad of backing non-consensus entrepreneurs on many occasions: An example of the “good” is Osman Rashid and Aayush Phumbra of Chegg.
作為一個(gè)投資人，我多次支持非共識創(chuàng )業(yè)者，結果有好有壞：“好” 的一個(gè)例子是 Chegg 的創(chuàng )始人 Osman Rashid 和 Aayush Phumbra。
Founded in 2006, Chegg enabled college students to rent textbooks instead of buying them. The value proposition was simple: Rather than pay $100 for a textbook, why not rent it for $30-$40 and give it back? It turns out that students agreed that this value proposition was compelling; Chegg’ s business took off rapidly.
Chegg 公司成立于 2006年，使大學(xué)生租課本而不是購買(mǎi)它們。價(jià)值主張很簡(jiǎn)單：與其支付 $100 買(mǎi)教科書(shū)，為什么不用 $30-$40 租然后把它還回去？事實(shí)證明，學(xué)生們一致認為，這一價(jià)值主張是令人信服的; Chegg 的業(yè)務(wù)起飛迅速。
In hindsight, you might be surprised that Chegg struggled to raise money more than any company we had backed when it was fundraising in early 2008. We spoke with every VC you can imagine on Sand Hill Road and elsewhere and everyone kept passing. Some cited the example of Varsity Books, which had been a startup right as the bubble burst and which consumed lots of capital for not so great an outcome. A few suggested that the experiment had failed at campus bookstores and that if the experiment didn’ t work with the people who had the most power and mindshare with the students, how could a startup succeed at such a challenging task?
現在回想起來(lái)，你可能會(huì )感到驚訝，2008年 初 Chegg 募資的時(shí)候，它比我們支持的任何一家公司都困難。我們和你可以在沙山路上和其他地方能想到的 VC 都聊了，每個(gè)人都說(shuō)不行。有些人引用 Varsity Books 公司的例子，它剛好在是泡沫破滅時(shí)候的一個(gè)創(chuàng )業(yè)公司，消耗大量的資本結果卻不怎么樣。一些人說(shuō)這樣的試驗在校園書(shū)店已經(jīng)失敗了，如果那些對學(xué)生而言實(shí)力最強并且最有影響力的人都搞不成，一個(gè)創(chuàng )業(yè)公司怎么能完成這個(gè)挑戰性的任務(wù)？
But Osman and Aayush believed that the conventional wisdom was wrong. They saw that students were spending more and more of their time online with social networks and were buying more of their books online rather than through campus bookstores. They also saw that there was an education bubble forming, and the costs of higher learning were outpacing the overall costs of other goods and services in the economy, creating increasing incentives for students to find new ways to save money. They recognized that Netflix had recently proven that people were willing to rent their media through the Internet. Finally, they saw that college bookstores were operating with an extraordinarily profitable but inefficient model for selling new and used books, which offered a very attractive pricing umbrella to attack.
但是，Osman 和 Aayush 認為，傳統的智慧是錯誤的。他們看到，學(xué)生們在社交網(wǎng)絡(luò )上花費越來(lái)越多的時(shí)間，并且相比于校園書(shū)店，他們越來(lái)越多的從網(wǎng)上買(mǎi)書(shū)。他們還看到教育的泡沫形成，獲得更高教育的的費用超過(guò)了經(jīng)濟中其他商品和服務(wù)的總成本，學(xué)生有動(dòng)力尋找新的方法來(lái)省錢(qián)。他們認為，Netflix 最近證明了，人們愿意通過(guò)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)租用他們的媒體。最后，他們看到大學(xué)書(shū)店銷(xiāo)售新書(shū)和舊書(shū)的運營(yíng)模式極度有利可圖而又效率低下，這導致它們的價(jià)格保護傘非常容易攻擊。
Chegg’ s business results kept improving despite their difficulty raising money. Finally in the Summer of 2008, Chegg got its lucky break and both Kleiner Perkins, and Foundation Capital decided to invest. The money came in when we had less than a week’ s worth of cash remaining. Suddenly Chegg had a sizeable war chest to grow the business. Chegg ultimately went public in 2013.
盡管融資困難，Chegg 的業(yè)務(wù)持續進(jìn)步。終于在 2008年 夏天，Chegg 得到了它的幸運符，KPCB 和 Foundation Capital 都決定投資。這些錢(qián)進(jìn)來(lái)的時(shí)候，我們賬上還有不到一個(gè)星期的剩余現金。突然，Chegg 有了一筆相當大的戰爭基金來(lái)發(fā)展業(yè)務(wù)。 Chegg 最終在 2013年 上市。
4. Finding Your Secret (發(fā)現你的秘密）
When you internalize that most people all around us are driven reflexively by mimetic instincts, it can be a profound epiphany. It shines a light on things surrounding us that most people never notice; things that maybe even you were not awake to observing. Suddenly, it helps you see that secrets are everywhere?—?it’ s just that most people are too busy focusing on winning by someone else’ s rules to truly look. It also helps you realize that when you discover a secret, most people are not going to give you very much encouragement. If your goal is to create something truly legendary?—?don’ t let the rejection of a lot of people or a lot of VCs discourage you. It turns out that a fair amount of skepticism can be a good sign. If too many agree with you, you might discover that you are a conventional team with a conventional idea led by conventional investors.
當你本能的意識到，我們身邊的大多數人都是條件反射般的被模仿本能驅動(dòng)，這可是一個(gè)深刻的頓悟。它會(huì )照亮我們身邊大多數人不會(huì )注意到的東西，甚至你不清醒的話(huà)也觀(guān)察不到。突然，它可以幫助你看到秘密無(wú)處不在 - 大多數人都太忙，專(zhuān)注于按別人的規則去贏(yíng)，而不能仔細觀(guān)察。它還可以幫助你認識到，當你發(fā)現一個(gè)秘密，大多數人都不會(huì )給你很多鼓勵。如果你的目標是創(chuàng )造出真正的傳奇 - 不要讓很多人的排斥或者很多 VC 勸阻你。事實(shí)證明，相當數量的懷疑可能是一個(gè)好兆頭。如果有太多的人同意你的看法，你可能會(huì )發(fā)現你是一個(gè)傳統的團隊，擁有傳統投資人認同的傳統的商業(yè)想法。
Another thing to consider: Unique insights in technology come from cutting edge founders working on new technologies that are not yet widely understood. As an analogy, suppose the entire world speaks in the language of Cartesian Coordinates, but you are one of the first people in the whole world to learn about Polar Coordinates. In fact, you may be so unencumbered by the traditional model that you know Polar way better than you know Cartesian. You can almost always win if the world is about to “go Polar” because you do not have to translate your old thinking into a new way of thinking. Bill Gates did not have to unlearn that computer hardware was “expensive” because he never learned it in the first place. He came of age on the personal computer at a time when the industry revolved around mainframes. He was ideally suited to see that in a world of “free” compute power, the software would become the scarce and valuable resource.
另一件要考慮的事情：獨特的技術(shù)洞見(jiàn)來(lái)自最前沿的創(chuàng )始人，他們所從事的新技術(shù)并不被廣泛理解。打個(gè)比方，假設整個(gè)世界都在用直角坐標的語(yǔ)言說(shuō)話(huà)，但你是全世界第一個(gè)學(xué)習極坐標的人。事實(shí)上，舊的模型對你毫無(wú)障礙，你對極坐標的了解遠勝過(guò)你對直角坐標的了解。如果世界走向極坐標，你肯定會(huì )贏(yíng)，因為你無(wú)需把你的舊思維轉化為一種新的思維方式。比爾·蓋茨不需要忘掉計算機硬件是 “貴” 的，因為他從來(lái)沒(méi)有去了解它。當業(yè)界還圍繞大型機的時(shí)候，他已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了個(gè)人計算機時(shí)代。他恰如其時(shí)地看到，在擁有 “自由” 計算能力的世界中，軟件將成為稀缺和寶貴的資源。
As a VC, I am thrilled that most investors use conventional pattern matching. How else would I have a chance to compete? And this same miracle of circumstance is even more true of the opportunity to be a startup founder. Not many entrepreneurs are willing to be unconventional enough to achieve a legendary breakthrough. But that doesn’ t mean you can’ t be one of the rare few.
作為一個(gè) VC，我很高興，大多數投資者使用傳統的模式匹配。不然，我哪里還有機會(huì )去競爭？對于創(chuàng )業(yè)者而言，其所處的環(huán)境更是如此。沒(méi)有多少創(chuàng )業(yè)者愿意標新立異，實(shí)現傳奇性的突破。但是，這并不意味著(zhù)你不能成為極少數人之一。
Some of you might be thinking “Hey wait a minute. Haven’ t some legendary startups not had a big secret or a non-consensus view?” The answer is yes, and perhaps that’ s for a different post in the future. But it’ s far rarer than most think. In the meantime, most founders will discover that the huge breakthroughs almost always happen from a fundamental insight that is destined to be true but is not accepted by most.
有些人可能會(huì )想 “嘿，等一下。難道非得所有的傳奇公司都擁有一個(gè)大秘密或非共識的看法嗎？“ 答案是不一定。未來(lái)我會(huì )寫(xiě)另一篇文章來(lái)解釋。但這種情況及其罕見(jiàn)。在此期間，大多數的創(chuàng )始人會(huì )發(fā)現巨大的突破幾乎總是來(lái)自一個(gè)根本性的洞見(jiàn)，這個(gè)洞見(jiàn)注定是正確的，但是大多數人不接受它。
May you find your secret, while the rest of the world plays someone else’ s game.
發(fā)現你的秘密，當世界上的其他人還在按照別人的規則游戲。
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