[2012.4.28]Funny money, fuzzy maths不明的財源，模糊的數字
The euro zone’s rescue fund歐元區救助基金
Funny money, fuzzy maths不明的財源，模糊的數字
The IMF’s coffers are fuller, but the euro zone’s “firewall” is still flimsy
IMF金庫充盈，歐元防火墻依舊薄弱
CHRISTINE LAGARDE, the IMF’s managing director, boasted of a “Washington moment”. At its spring meetings in theAmerican capital this month, the fund saw its lending power almost double,thanks to the promise of $430 billion in loans from more than a score of itsmembers. The official goal is to boost a “global firewall” against crisis. The unofficial hope is that a fatter IMF will help ease fears about the euro, by bolstering the €700 billion ($925 billion) that euro-zone economies have pledged in their own rescue funds.
IMF總裁克麗絲汀.拉嘉德女士驕傲地宣稱(chēng)“華盛頓時(shí)刻”已經(jīng)實(shí)現。IMF春季會(huì )議于本月在華盛頓召開(kāi)，20多個(gè)成員國的注資承諾使IMF可貸資金規模幾乎擴大一倍，增加4300億美元以上。IMF的官方目標是推動(dòng)建立“全球防火墻”以擺脫經(jīng)濟危機。私下則希望一個(gè)資金充足的IMF可以通過(guò)擴從歐元區救助基金來(lái)緩和歐洲的恐慌情緒，目前該基金放貸規模已達到7000億歐元（約合9250億美元）。
Europeans often simplyadd the two numbers together, implying there is now a vast $1.4 trillion stash.Not so. Look behind the fat figures and you find a lot of fuzzy maths and wishful thinking—just as worsening news in Spain brings talk of that country needing a rescue (see article).
歐洲人總是簡(jiǎn)單地將這兩項金額相加，認為現在歐洲擁有高達1.4萬(wàn)億的儲備資金。事實(shí)并非如此。重新審視這個(gè)巨額數字，我們會(huì )發(fā)現大量模糊的數字和一廂情愿的想法——看看西班牙就明白了，不斷惡化的局勢下，人們紛紛討論政府是否需要外部救助。
Start with the IMF. Assuming countries make good on their pledges, the money itself is real. The biggest collective contribution will come from the euro-zone countries, which have promised to lend the fund $200 billion between them. Japan is the biggest single donor, with a $60 billion pledge motivated partly by a desire not to be eclipsed by China, partly by fears about its own economic vulnerability. Big emerging economies, such as China, Russiaand Brazil,agreed to chip in. Their contribution, and that of others such as Britain, will be contingent on reforms to the fund’s governance, which reduce Europe’s cloutand increase that of emerging economies. (America, notably, did not contribute.)
我們從IMF開(kāi)始分析 。假如注資國家兌現他們的承諾，資金可以到位。那么最大的捐贈團體為歐元區國家，他們允諾向IMF注資2000億歐元；而日本以高達600億美元的注資搶得頭彩，之所以如此大方，一方面是日本不想被中國的光芒所掩蓋，另一方面也表現出對其國內經(jīng)濟脆弱性的擔憂(yōu)。像中國、俄羅斯和巴西這樣的新興經(jīng)濟體也表示了捐助意愿。這些國家（包括英國等國）的注資金額將視IMF的治理改革情況而定，他們希望提升自己在IMF的份額和影響力。值得注意的是，美國表示不會(huì )增資IMF。
Barring a big fight over its governance, the fund should be flusher soon. But no one wants to write a blank cheque forthe rich euro zone. Canada(which itself did not contribute) called for a double lock: future IMF lending to the euro zone would need to be approved by a vote among non-European members. That probably will not happen, but the fund, at best, will be aminority contributor to future rescues.
若果不因治理方式改革而引起成員國的紛爭，IMF的錢(qián)包將很快鼓起來(lái)?？墒菦](méi)有哪個(gè)國家愿意給富裕的歐元區開(kāi)出空白支票。加拿大（已經(jīng)表示拒絕注資）呼吁建立雙保險機制：未來(lái)IMF向歐元區借款應該取得非歐洲成員國的同意。這難以實(shí)現，但至少會(huì )使IMF不會(huì )充當未來(lái)救助工作的“冤大頭
So the big bucks will have to come from Europe’s own rescue funds. And they are scantier than they seem. Both the EFSF (the existing rescue facility) and the ESM (a new permanent fund) need to raise resources by issuing debt. The EFSF backs its bonds with guarantees from the dwindling number of AAA-rated governments; the ESM will have some paid-in capital. But both could find it hard to raise the large sums that might be required for, say, a swift bank recapitalisation in Spain.
由此看出，這一大筆錢(qián)只能由歐元區自己的救助基金出，而這些救助基金比我們想象的更缺錢(qián)。歐洲金融穩定基金（EFSF，一個(gè)已經(jīng)存在的救助基金）和歐洲穩定機制（ESM，一個(gè)新成立的永久性基金）都只能通過(guò)發(fā)行債券來(lái)募集資金。EFSF依靠信用評級為AAA級別的國家的擔保來(lái)支持債券發(fā)行，可是歐元區擁有AAA信用評級的國家越來(lái)越少；而ESM將會(huì )擁有一些實(shí)收資本?？墒?，這兩個(gè)基金在面對巨額資金需求時(shí)（比如西班牙面臨的銀行資本迅速重整）都顯得力不從心。
So speculation is growing that the funds would not bother with hard cash. One idea is for Spainto have a system-wide asset-protection scheme, where the banks’ toxic assets would be insured by euro-zone guarantees. Another is for the rescue funds to issue bonds to Spain’s own bank-rescue fund, just as the EFSF gave Greek bond holders a bond instead of cash as part of that country’s debt restructuring.
越來(lái)越多人猜測這些基金并不用為現金煩惱。一種辦法是，西班牙應當建立系統范圍的資產(chǎn)保護機制，在該機制下歐元區可為銀行不良資產(chǎn)提供擔保。另一種辦法是，由救助基金直接向西班牙的銀行救助基金發(fā)行債券，正如EFSF向希臘政府債券持有者出售新的債券而不是用現金清償債務(wù)，這也是希臘債務(wù)重組的一部分。
Another problem is that both the IMF and ESM are considered“preferred creditors”, which means any borrowing from them is first in line for repayment. If rescue money is sent to the Spanish government to prop up itsbanks, those same banks’ holdings of government bonds may be worth less. A big rescue could actually end up reducing confidence. The newly thickened firewallis less solid than it appears.
還有一個(gè)問(wèn)題就是IMF和ESM都被看做是優(yōu)先債權人，這意味著(zhù)這意味著(zhù)任何從他們那里得到的借款都必須優(yōu)先償還。如果將救助金注入西班牙政府救來(lái)幫助其支撐本國銀行，其他銀行持有的政府債券很可能貶值。大規模的救助行動(dòng)很可能最終以削弱市場(chǎng)信心告終。這道新加固的歐洲防火墻并不像看上去那樣堅固。
from the printedition | Finance and economics
